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Top Secret 219

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Friday 2 June 1978

CG NIDC 78/128C

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday, 2 June 1978.

[REDACTED] The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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EGYPT-ISRAEL: Sadat's Policies

25X1 [] Egyptian President Sadat, by suggesting in a press interview on Tuesday that October would be a time of decision for his peace initiative, is trying to create a sense of urgency in order to revive the faltering negotiating process. Even so, Sadat's statement does not appear to be just a tactical ploy, and he probably does intend to shift policies should no breakthrough in negotiations occur. The domestic scene, meanwhile, remains troubled. Negative reaction to Sadat's domestic political crackdown continues, and he has again sought to justify it to a skeptical Egyptian elite.

25X1 [] A policy shift by Sadat could begin as early as mid-summer. In his interview, Sadat said any Arab summit should be put off for two months, because his initiative will either gain momentum or prove to be a failure within that time frame. Sadat had not previously suggested that the success or failure of his initiative might be determined that soon.

25X1 [] The implication of Sadat's comment is that--in the absence of progress--he may be prepared to acknowledge his effort to secure peace through direct talks with Israel has failed and new tactics are needed. Syrian President Assad has made such an acknowledgment the basis for a reconciliation with Sadat. Visible movements by Sadat toward a reconciliation with Assad would add to the pressures on Israel and the US to produce movement in the negotiations before October.

25X1 [] Egypt's media have contributed to Sadat's psychological campaign by drawing attention to Sadat's interview with a *New York Times* correspondent last month. In that interview, Sadat reversed earlier statements and suggested that a new war with Israel is possible. Two Cairo dailies, in nearly identical editorials that suggest official guidance, referred to the interview as a "genuine warning" to Israel that the October 1973 war was not necessarily the last.

25X1 [] Sadat on Sunday lectured Alexandria University faculty members who had protested his recent referendum. He held a similar meeting with journalists last week.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Reaction among educated Egyptians to the referendum has been almost universally negative. Critics argue that neither the left nor the right presented a real threat to the government, that much of their criticism was justified and should be expected in a democratic system, and that Sadat's tactics have unnecessarily hurt his and Egypt's image. The mass of Egyptians, who tend automatically to support the President, probably do not share these views.

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[REDACTED] Initially, the government has applied the new restrictions to leftists in the media. Five prominent writers, including Nasir's former confidant Mohammed Haykal, have been forbidden to travel while the government prosecutor investigates charges that their writings published abroad have "threatened security of the internal front."

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[REDACTED] Procedures for dealing with the accused appear complex and so blatantly political that the heavy criticism is likely to continue. The prosecutor will apparently submit his case to a special court of three "popular judges" and three laymen. They will pass on their judgment to the People's Assembly for a yes or no vote.

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[REDACTED] Sadat, under questioning by the faculty members, admitted that he wished to keep the proceedings out of the regular criminal system and that the accused journalists had committed no crime under existing law. The retroactive feature of the referendum has been sharply criticized by Egypt's bar association.

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
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
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ZAIRE: Mixed Attitudes in Shaba

[Redacted] Residents of Zaire's Shaba Region have greeted the recapture of Kolwezi by foreign troops with mixed feelings. The European community and the small professional and technical elite welcomed the foreign intervention as the only way Kolwezi could have been retaken and the rest of Shaba stabilized. There is, however, general recognition that Shaba's basic problems are internal, both political and economic, and that the Mobutu government--which is extremely unpopular in Shaba--is unlikely to come to grips with them.



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According to the US Consulate in Lubumbashi, most Zairians in Shaba apparently showed solidarity with the Katangan invaders at first but were indifferent to their socialist rhetoric and were quickly alienated by their uncontrolled brutality. Those Zairians native to southern Shaba and villages near Kolwezi were apparently more sympathetic to the invaders than were Zairians from northern Shaba.

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Antigovernment feelings have been strong for many years in southern Shaba but a radical Marxist ideology has never taken hold. Many of the better informed Shabans refuse to believe that the Congolese Liberation Front is a genuine socialist force and view it as a group that has made an alliance of convenience with Angola and Cuba in exchange for arms and training. The poorer Zairians are unconcerned about Cuban involvement or socialism; they own little and have little at stake. In general, Shabans believe the invading force was almost entirely composed of dissident Zairians, perhaps largely of Shaban origin.

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The invading force was apparently joined by large numbers of local unemployed--some of whom seized the opportunity to loot--as well as by infiltrators who had hidden in the cities. According to sources of the US Consulate in Lubumbashi, perhaps only 50 percent of the occupying force arrived from outside of Kolwezi. Those who emerged from within Kolwezi apparently caused most of the violence of the last days.

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The Shabans have legitimate grievances against the central government: chronic shortages of food and basic necessities; unemployment and inflation; exploitation of the region's wealth for other parts of the country--notably Kinshasa; decisionmaking handled increasingly by the Kinshasa elite; harassment and extortion of Shabans by military and civilian officials appointed by Kinshasa; neglect of roads, schools, and health facilities; and discrimination against Shabans in general and Lunda tribesmen in particular. President Mobutu is popularly viewed in Shaba as a venal man concerned only with the well-being of his family and a close group of supporters.

25X1

The antagonism between the Zairian military and the local population in Shaba is longstanding. Even in peaceful times, the poorly paid soldiers extort what they can from travelers and mistreat civilians in the poorer urban areas.

25X1 [] Shabans with economic interests are concerned first with stability and are therefore favorable to a continued Western presence. Many, however, resent the foreign troops because they enable the Mobutu government to cling to power.

25X1 [] Among the Europeans in Shaba there is recognition of Mobutu's shortcomings, but most are concerned about personal security for themselves and their families. The Europeans believe that another attack like the one on Kolwezi is very likely in the near future and that only a continuing Western presence can provide adequate security and counter what they perceive as a Soviet threat to Shaba's wealth.

25X1 [] The Europeans are aware that the masses envy their comparative wealth and that many Zairians view them as willing collaborators in Kinshasa's exploitation of Shaba. They believe that they and their families would be the primary victims of changes brought about by the Katangan rebels.

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MOROCCO-ZAIRE: Mobutu's Visit

25X1 [] *The cool reception Moroccan King Hassan gave visiting Zairian President Mobutu is a further indication of his cautious approach to sending significant Moroccan forces to Zaire. The Moroccans also appear to have doubts about Mobutu's political prospects in the absence of significant domestic political reforms.*

25X1 [] The US Embassy in Rabat reports that Mobutu's talks with King Hassan on Monday were difficult. Hassan probably attached conditions--such as internal political reforms and pan-African participation in any peacekeeping force--to his willingness to send troops to Zaire.

25X1 [] Morocco's perception of the strategic importance of Zaire remains unchanged, but its willingness to support Mobutu personally has diminished. During the Zairian President's visit to Rabat, the government-controlled press avoided any praise of Mobutu, a marked contrast to a similar visit in mid-1977.

25X1 [] Only a small Moroccan military mission has so far been sent to Zaire. In addition to a few in Kinshasa, some 30 Moroccans arrived in Lubumbashi on 30 May, presumably to obtain a

firsthand appraisal of the military situation in Shaba. Hassan will not make any final decision on military assistance for Zaire until he receives their appraisal of the situation.

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[] Hassan is sensitive to African criticism of, and the lack of strong Western support for, Morocco's military role in Zaire's Shaba Region last year. This time, he clearly wants Western political support and at least token participation by other African countries to offset anticipated criticism from those African states that oppose external efforts to shore up the Mobutu regime. []

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BRIEFS

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Zambia-Angola

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[] Zambian President Kaunda will meet with Angolan President Neto this weekend, primarily to discuss Namibia. The two Presidents will firm up arrangements for a meeting of frontline leaders, possibly as soon as 10 June, which would focus on Namibia.

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[] Neto may be less willing than Kaunda and Tanzanian President Nyerere to urge the South-West Africa People's Organization to return to the negotiating table, a key aim of the Western contact group. Angola is still smarting from the South African raid on SWAPO bases in southern Angola. South African forces occasionally have also crossed into Zambia to attack SWAPO forces based there, and Kaunda would like to see SWAPO agree to a Namibian settlement. []

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